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Morally Wrong Beauty as a Source of Value
María José Alcaraz León
abstract  In this paper I would like to address the problem of the aesthetic 
value of damaged nature. A variety of arguments have been offered in order 
to ground the view that we cannot perceive damaged nature as beautiful, at 
least as soon as we are aware of its damaged condition. These arguments are 
usually offered in tandem with a view about what the correct appreciation of 
nature involves and, hence, are often supported by this view. 
 I will try to show that none of these arguments are compelling and that 
there seems to be a way of explaining how damaged nature can be beautiful 
without disposing of the intuition that the awareness of its damaged condition 
penetrates our perception. 
keywords Natural beauty, aesthetic appreciation of nature, environmental 
value, environmental damage, moral wrongness
Introduction
Some examples of contaminated rivers or valleys, like the strikingly beau-
tiful landscape of the Tinto River (in Huelva, Spain) or of damaged land-
scapes resulting from major mining work – like the amazingly colourful 
hills surrounding the mines of Mazarrón and La Unión (South East Spain) 
– can provide, I think, some paradigmatic examples of natural beauty. 
That is, I think that they can be justifiably regarded as beautiful.1 
However, these cases are also regarded as problematic because they are 
the result of some sort of ecological damage or alteration which tends to be 
viewed as an impediment to taking pleasure in their alleged beauty: Either 
we stop perceiving these sites as beautiful when we know how they really 
came to look like this – that is, our knowledge of their devastating ecologi-
cal history penetrates into our perception and prevents us from finding 
them beautiful, or we refrain from acknowledging their possible beauty by 
appealing to ecological reasons. Thus, burnt woods, contaminated rivers, 
and dried valleys cannot – or should not be considered as – beautiful.
There are a number of ways one can approach these problematic cases. 
I will try to offer an overview of the most prominent views and argu-
ments that have been provided in order to deal with these cases, and I 
will try to defend the view that damaged nature need not necessarily be 
perceived as ugly when we are fully aware of its damaged character. 
My classification of these views provides some insight into the na-
ture of these cases by dividing them into two categories: On the one 
hand, there are a number of views which claim damaged nature cannot 
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be beautiful because the knowledge that it is damaged penetrates our 
perception to the point of changing our aesthetic experience of it. Still, 
it is possible for an advocate of this view to defend the idea that the ex-
perience afforded by damaged nature might still be worthy aesthetically. 
Maybe the ugliness perceived in damaged landscapes is similar to the 
ugliness that some paradigmatic works of art manifest and that consti-
tutes the source of their value. I will briefly explore this possibility, but 
I will reject it as a possible explanation for what is at stake in the cases I 
have in mind. 
On the other hand, it is possible to defend the claim that damaged na-
ture might appear as beautiful. This possibility rests upon a Kantian un-
derstanding of aesthetic experience. If aesthetic experience is such that 
no concept whatsoever should determine our response of pleasure or dis-
pleasure, ecological considerations should have no bearing upon our aes-
thetic judgement and, hence, that beauty depends solely upon the form 
of the natural environment under consideration. However disastrous the 
ecological history of a particular place might be, if its form is appealing 
I may have reasons to judge it beautiful. In emphasizing the autonomy 
and the a-conceptual character of the judgement of taste, it does not need 
to accommodate the intuition that our aesthetic judgements must be in 
tune with ecological considerations. In fact, an advocate of the Kantian 
approach may proclaim damaged nature beautiful precisely because the 
view leaves the consideration of the environment’s damaged condition 
outside the experience that grounds the aesthetic judgement.
In contrast to these two approaches, I aim at defending the view that 
damaged nature might be beautiful even if we know that its appearance 
is the result of some ecological damage and even precisely because we 
know this. Thus, I endorse the view that knowledge about the object we 
aesthetically perceive penetrates our perceptual experience and partly 
informs it. However, I do not think that the polarity we usually attach 
to the non-aesthetic features or valuable features we also perceive when 
judging a natural object exclusively determines the polarity of our aes-
thetic judgement. It may be that in some cases, the perceived damage 
prevents the object from looking beautiful, but in some others this does 
not seem to be so, unless we force ourselves to stop seeing the beauty 
that, prima facie, seems to be there. I think there is some relationship 
between our knowledge of objects and natural environments from non-
aesthetic points of view and our aesthetic experience of them, but this is 
not necessarily one of complete determinism. Healthy nature may look 
ugly and damaged nature beautiful. 
Morally Wrong Beauty as a Source of Value
39
Caveat2
Before addressing some of the alternative ways of approaching the 
problem of the aesthetic value of damaged nature, I would like to an-
swer a possible objection against the very nature of the problem. It 
could be claimed that the problem is not deciding whether damaged 
environments can be beautiful or not, but deciding whether or not to 
adopt the aesthetic stance towards something which should not be 
perceived, experienced, or assessed in this way. The problem is, it is 
claimed, that adopting an aesthetic attitude is not even appropriate in 
these cases. The reason the inappropriateness of the aesthetic attitude 
is said to be similar to the reason for not taking an aesthetic stance 
towards war, murder, rape or any other sort of human violence. More 
generally, aesthetic pleasure seems to be forbidden not only when we 
encounter real terrible events, but also when we look at photographs or 
recorded images of events of this sort. 
Thus, there seems to be an underlying maxim that inhibits the po-
tential aesthetic pleasure that might be derived from dealing with par-
ticularly atrocious scenes, situations, or actions, as if adopting a proper 
moral attitude towards the scene or the representation would be con-
trary to perceiving it aesthetically. The implicit acceptance of this maxim 
seems to be confirmed by many actual troublesome cases in which the 
mere possibility of an aesthetic attitude has been the subject of much dis-
cussion; in fact, in most cases, the aesthetic appreciation of a particular 
representation has been found morally objectionable. 
Similarly, one could think that this incompatibility between the aes-
thetic attitude and some problematic contents can be also identified in 
the case that concerns us here. Maybe damaged nature is not the sort 
of thing that we should address from an aesthetic point of view. Maybe 
the moral concerns that are triggered by the ecological considerations 
about a damaged environment are such that no aesthetic attitude seems 
acceptable. 
My view is that, although there is certainly some analogy between the 
aesthetic appreciation of damaged nature and the aesthetic appreciation 
of damaged humanity (if we want to put it that way), the analogy is not 
complete. Not because in both cases the scene is not amenable to aes-
thetic appreciation – that is precisely the reason why the problem arises 
in the first place – but because the role our moral concerns play in each 
case seems different – or at least of a different degree. 
It seems to me that the moral concerns we apparently have towards 
the subjects involved in a terrible situation are not on a par with the 
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moral attitude appropriate in cases in which nature is seen as damaged. 
While there seems to be something morally wrong in perceiving human 
harm aesthetically – as if contemplating the situation from an aesthetic 
point of view might itself cause even more harm3 – there seems to be no 
harm in addressing damaged nature as an aesthetic object. The reasons 
why this asymmetry holds are difficult to specify: maybe in the former 
case we are dealing with people understood as subjects while this is not 
the case in the latter, and perhaps this has some relevance in explaining 
the seeming different moral demands that each situation imposes on us. 
In this way, there seems to be different moral requirements in each situa-
tion, for we do not feel inclined to blame someone who takes an aesthetic 
attitude towards a natural damaged environment in the way we usually 
do when assessing someone’s aesthetic attitude towards, say, victims of 
war or victims of the Holocaust. 
This asymmetry does not involve completely disregarding the dam-
aged condition of the natural environment that we perceive or that we 
think it is not regrettable. It only shows that its damaged condition im-
poses moral concerns of a sort that do not necessary clash with aesthetic 
pleasure.
After having justified the appropriateness of addressing damaged 
nature as an object of aesthetic contemplation, I will try to review some 
of the main views that have dealt with this problem and then go on to 
offer my own. 
 
Some views about the aesthetic value of damaged nature
Despite the variety of views on aesthetic appreciation, there seems to 
be a striking agreement about the impossibility of regarding damaged 
nature4 as beautiful. One of the most recent defenders of this claim has 
been David E. Cooper in his article “Beautiful People, Beautiful Things.”5 
Cooper defends virtue-centrism, a view of the relationship between our 
moral and aesthetic perception that strongly links the perception of 
beauty to virtue and vice versa of ugliness to vice. Cooper’s main point is 
that aesthetic perception is intimately linked to the perception of beauty 
in the human body and that this, in turn, cannot be separated from con-
siderations of the moral character expressed in the features we regard as 
beautiful; our perception of the human body as expressive of character 
and its beauty or ugliness are, as it were, of one piece. He tries to dis-
tinguish his view from moralist, utilitarian and evolutionary accounts 
that could similarly ground the idea that beauty cannot be perceived in 
objects that have been produced through morally wrong means or that 
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promote some immoral perspective. In Cooper’s view it is not a matter 
of showing how higher or prior aspects of an object, such as its moral, 
functional or evolutionary worth, determine its beauty. Rather, beauty is 
constitutive of the moral character expressed in it. 
Cooper does not directly show why there is an essential relationship 
between perceiving something as beautiful and perceiving it as ex-
pressive of some virtue (he tries to make this idea more convincing by 
elaborating the thought that aesthetic perception is basically linked to 
the perception of expressive character; in particular, expressive human 
character.) Instead, he offers a set of arguments that indirectly qualify 
his idea. I cannot examine each of them in detail here, but I think it is 
at least worthwhile focussing on one of them; for I think it shows that, 
contrary to what seems to be Cooper’s position, there is an underlying 
conviction that moral issues are more important than aesthetic ones and, 
consequently, that only rightness in the former domain can guarantee 
aesthetic worth in the latter.
Cooper claims that the importance we attribute to beauty in our lives 
could not be so readily understood if beauty were not “a manifestation 
[…] of what is most admirable in human beings: their virtues.”6 To some 
extent, Cooper is claiming that the value of beauty rests upon the value 
of “what is most admirable in human beings,” and that beauty has its 
own role in human life from its relation to vices and virtues. This might 
be a subtle form of moralism, but moralism it is nevertheless. It does not 
only claim that the significant value of beauty cannot be accounted for 
unless it is connected to other “most admirable” values,7 but also that, as 
Cooper himself states, “someone cannot authentically regard something 
as beautiful unless he or she is able to experience it as appropriately re-
lated to the manifestation of human virtue.”8
Although Cooper mostly discusses examples of beautiful works such 
as music, paintings, buildings, and even ordinary objects, I take his view 
as a general account of the relationship between the perception of beauty 
and the perception of other ethical values. In fact, Cooper conceives his 
own view as being highly comprehensive and claims that “things or ob-
jects, whether natural or artefactual, are beautiful only when suitably 
related to beautiful features of the lived body, and only, therefore, when 
they are appropriately related to human virtues.”9 To this extent, one 
may claim that it follows from his view that natural beauty must be cor-
respondingly connected to the perception of some kind of expressive 
character in nature or, at least, that some of its features are to be observed 
as if they were bodily expressive features of a morally good character. If, 
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according to virtue-centrism, the “primary location of beauty is in bodily 
expression of human virtues,”10 it seems that secondary senses of beauty 
must be connected to this idea as well. There is, of course a prima facie 
problem in understanding natural beauty along these lines as it seems 
less obvious how natural objects or landscapes may exhibit these fea-
tures in the same way as human bodies or human artefacts do.
However, even granting that perceiving nature in that way is possible, 
one may still wonder whether this view does not impose an unwarranted 
condition upon the possibility of nature appearing as beautiful to us. For 
if beauty and virtue are two aspects of the same perception it seems odd 
to claim that one can experience a damaged landscape as beautiful. The 
reason why this may be so is because, given the framework provided by 
Cooper, there seems to be an unproblematic understanding of damaged 
nature as a damaged body; a damaged body does not necessarily have to 
be perceived as embodying the expression of vice, but it is, at least, per-
ceived as the result of some violence or aggression. In fact, we can barely 
make sense of positive aesthetic judgements about damaged bodies (ex-
cept, maybe, done within the narrow context of medical admiration; as 
when we hear about a beautiful wound). For that reason, if a damaged 
body is not the sort of thing that would appropriately prompt a judge-
ment of beauty, neither would a damaged landscape. 
I think Cooper’s approach is insightful in the sense that he acknowl-
edges the connections between aesthetic and other (ethical) values, 
however, he does this to the point of being unable to disentangle them 
in what we take as paradigmatic cases of aesthetic perception. How-
ever, he seems to specify this relationship in a way that makes beauty 
a sort of manifestation of other more esteemed values. This is why, in 
his view, damaged landscapes or natural objects could not justifiably 
be said to be beautiful, even if our aesthetic experience sometimes tells 
us the opposite.
The Cognitivist strategy
Another way of making the case for a beautiful damaged landscape prob-
lematic has been proposed by authors such as Allen Carlson11 and Mar-
cia Muelder Eaton.12 The basic idea shared by these authors is that the 
aesthetic appreciation of nature can – and, indeed, should – be informed 
by our best scientific knowledge about the natural environment judged. 
The most prominent defender of this position has been Allen Carlson 
who has defended the view known as the Cognitivist-scientifc theory of 
aesthetic appreciation. He claims our aesthetic judgements about natu-
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ral objects and environments cannot be correct unless our perceptual 
experience is adequately informed by the available scientific knowledge 
about the objects or environments in question. Once we possess both 
the accurate knowledge about how some natural item functions and aes-
thetic sensitivity, we may rightly perceive its features and, hence, derive 
pleasure from them. 
In fact, Carlson is also a defender of the Positive Aesthetics thesis, 
which claims that all pristine nature is beautiful.13 He thinks that the 
Positive Aesthetics view fits quite nicely with his scientific-cognitivist 
view about aesthetic appreciation of natural environments. The very 
nature of scientific discourse – and its structural need to conceptually 
capture natural species and environments in a way that makes it neces-
sary to appeal to concepts of order, symmetry, structured systems, etc. 
– provides a reason to think that nature will always look beautiful when 
viewed through the right scientific categories. It is this underlying search 
for order, intrinsic to the very constitution of scientific discourse, that 
gives us a reason to believe that, when perceived in light of the right 
scientific categories, all particular natural items will look beautiful. They 
will look aesthetically pleasing because, in perceiving them through the 
right scientific categories, we will implicitly perceive them as ordered 
and structured – and these are qualities that we tend to find aesthetic 
pleasure in. As Carlson puts it: “those qualities that make the world seem 
comprehensive to us are also those that we find aesthetically good.”14 In 
short, since scientific categories, in their attempt to satisfy categorical 
order and systematicity, tend to embody the very order and systematic-
ity that usually characterizes aesthetic pleasure; they provide a percep-
tual frame within which nature appears to us as ordered, systematic and, 
hence, beautiful. From this it easily follows that perceiving a particular 
natural item with aesthetic sensitivity and under its adequate scientific 
description will always produce aesthetic pleasure, and hence the con-
nection between Carlson’s scientific-cognitivism and his endorsement of 
the Aesthetic Positive claim is shown. 
Now, it seems easy to see how this view immediately provides reasons 
for not taking pleasure – aesthetic or other kinds of pleasure – in dam-
aged nature. If beauty judgements result from the proper scientific un-
derstanding of the untouched condition of the judged object, devastated 
or contaminated environments would necessarily be ugly. If healthy na-
ture usually exhibits the order and symmetry embodied in the concepts 
we use to categorize it, damaged nature, insofar as it looses its structural 
organicity, will likely lack that order or symmetry, and, hence, it will lack 
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the beauty associated to healthy tokens. Devastation will likely have a 
perceptual correlation in the forms we perceive. Damaged natural en-
vironments will not exhibit the order they possessed originally, and their 
damaged condition will be reflected in their deformed shape. In fact, if 
notions of symmetry, order, and balance usually play a role in the way we 
structure the environment conceptually, the expectation would be that 
contrary notions, such as asymmetry, chaos or lack of balance or form, 
would be signs of unhealthy environments or species. Thus a wounded 
plant or animal would probably exhibit some asymmetry in its body that 
would mar the possibility of taking aesthetic pleasure in it. 
I am less certain about what Carlson would say about naturally de-
formed or corrupted nature. Sometimes the presence of a stronger ani-
mal or vegetable species may destroy the conditions necessary for the 
flowering of other species. Often some magnum storm or hurricane de-
stroys most natural life found in its path. Since these are cases in which 
the damage has been caused naturally and no human intervention has 
taken place, should we regard them as ugly? Or are they also a difficult ex-
ample of how nature can be beautiful? It seems to follow from Carlson’s 
view that if the species that has become dominant – and that has caused 
the destruction of other species – has been artificially introduced, fed, or 
promoted by human beings, then the overall results can be considered 
negative aesthetically speaking. His case seems less justifiable once we 
pay attention to paradigmatic cases of ugly nature that have not been 
caused by any human intervention, such as death, decaying animal car-
casses or the results of a hurricane.15 Although I will not discuss this case 
here in detail, I think it is a valid question that weakens Carlson’s view. 
In any case, I think that as Emily Brady16 or Malcolm Budd17 have, 
among others, shown, the Cognitivist-scientific view about the aesthetic 
appreciation of nature faces several problems. Although our scientific 
common knowledge may affect the way we perceptually address some 
natural object or environment, this does not always amount to seeing the 
object in question as beautiful. In fact, Carlson somehow unjustifiably 
thinks understanding how something is in scientific terms will amount 
to appreciating it as beautiful. 
It seems undeniable that some remarkable species, such as the aye-aye 
or the star-nose mole, can be good examples of ugly species that remain 
ugly in spite of the scientific understanding that we might bring to our 
perceptual experience. Even when one possesses all the relevant knowl-
edge about these natural beings one might not stop judging them as ugly. 
Similarly, my knowledge that something has been the result of some dam-
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age need not necessarily change my perception of a beautiful object into 
something ugly. I may perhaps regret the fact that the resulting beauty 
has some natural disaster behind it, but this does not necessarily modi-
fy my perceptual experience of its beauty. As Emily Brady18 has pointed 
out, we should not collapse the notion of aesthetic perception of natural 
environments into the notion of scientific perception or perceiving an 
object in light of its correct scientific description. Scientific knowledge 
may inform our perceptual experience of the environment; however, this 
should not be taken to imply that the scientific conditions that determine 
whether some natural being or event is healthy or standard also provide 
the criteria for what counts as beautiful or aesthetically worthy.
 
The value of damaged nature as the value of its ugliness
Another possible way to address the problematic cases I am concerned 
with in this article is by adopting a strategy from Matthew Kieran’s hy-
pothesis in “Aesthetic Value: Beauty, Ugliness and Incoherence.”19 Kieran 
has attempted to show that the traditional notion of aesthetic value based 
upon pleasure leaves little room for paradigmatic cases of modern and 
contemporary art whose aesthetic value relies precisely on negative fea-
tures such as ugliness, disgust, or shock. Assuming he is successful in de-
fending this claim, we could extend this view to the aesthetic appreciation 
of natural environments. 
Thus, similarly, one could hold that, damaged nature, although always 
ugly or unpleasant, is still aesthetically worthy because it is possible to 
esteem it and find some value attached to its ugliness. Hence, not only 
is beautiful nature aesthetically worthy; ugly natural environments also 
deserve aesthetic attention. They might show difficult or negative aes-
thetic aspects usually lacking in what we take as the paradigmatic aes-
thetic experience of nature – sunsets, valley views, etc. – but this very 
lack might constitute its aesthetic strength. 
Emily Brady has actually defended the view that natural ugliness can 
be a reason for preserving some natural environments.20 In doing so, she 
is challenging the underlying assumption of some views such as Positive 
Aesthetics according to which an aesthetic argument for preservation 
can only rely upon the consideration of nature as being always beauti-
ful – or at least nature that has not been manipulated. In fact, her view 
is broader than Positive Aesthetics in one respect, for while the latter 
only consider beauty as a reason for natural preservation, Brady tries 
to include negative aesthetic qualities as also providing reasons of this 
sort. The reason is, again, that there is some value in negative aesthetic 
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experiences and, hence, that some action leading to the preservation of 
a particularly ugly environment can be justified. In short, ugliness can 
become an aesthetic reason for preservation. 
Both Kieran and Brady’s views, then, provide possible explanations 
for the possibility of damaged nature being aesthetically appealing and 
valuable in spite of its ugliness. Following their strategy – and without 
denying that they cannot be beautiful given the fact that they are re-
garded as the result of some harm – our examples could be rewritten so 
that they become aesthetically worthy in spite of their ugliness – or their 
being not quite beautiful to us. Notice that their views are not strictly 
speaking concerned with the issue of whether nature will look ugly be-
cause of its damaged condition. Rather, assuming it appears ugly, they 
provide theoretical tools to inject aesthetic value where only negative 
experience seemed to be allowed.
This view, however, is still one step short of what I take as our experi-
ence of some typically damaged landscapes. I do not think that simply 
giving some worth to ugly features of natural environments can do justice 
to what I believe is our experience of some damaged environments. I be-
lieve some of these environments can be perceived as beautiful or at least 
as aesthetically pleasing or interesting. Thus, merely acknowledging some 
value to negative aesthetic features does not provide the sort of vindi cating 
reason I need in order to show that damaged nature can be aesthetically 
worthy due to its beautiful character.
Damaged nature as beautiful
Now, I would like to address two possible ways of accounting for our 
positive experience of these problematic cases. I have already mentioned 
that one such strategy can be the Kantian approach.21 Following Kant’s 
characterization of the aesthetic judgement and the sort of experience 
that typically grounds it, we seem warranted in upholding the beauty 
of these landscapes in spite of their regrettable history of degeneration. 
Since the judgement is characterized as a-conceptual, disinterested one, 
there is no reason why we should take into account its damaged condi-
tion as part of, or as informing, our perceptual experience and hence our 
aesthetic judgement.22 
Therefore, within this framework a beautiful damaged landscape is 
not a puzzling case, for its damaged condition should not play any role 
whatsoever in my aesthetic experience of the landscape. If a landscape 
is said to be ugly it is not, and must not be, by virtue of its ecological 
health. 
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This, however, also falls short of what I would like to defend in this 
paper. I do not think our experience of the beauty of the landscape must 
necessarily sacrifice the awareness that it has been generated through 
ecologically devastating means. 
In fact, I agree with the claim that our knowledge of the damaged 
condition of the landscape penetrates – and must penetrate – our percep-
tion. But I do not think the way it informs my perceptual experience of 
the landscape automatically prevents me from seeing its beauty. What 
is more, it might even be the case that its former beauty is now tinted 
by some further significance, for the landscape is now seen in a way 
which relates those aspects we already appreciated as beautiful with a 
sort of story that makes salient how they came into their present state. 
We may still regret that such a beautiful part of the world is the result of 
processes of degeneration but that does not need to remove our pleasure 
in its appearance. 
My view actually combines some of the insights of the former views. 
I agree with the cognitivist approach that knowledge penetrates our aes-
thetic experience of the natural environment in question, but I disagree 
with it in that if the content of this knowledge reveals that the object has 
been misused or harmed then our aesthetic judgement must correspond-
ingly be negative. I also sympathise with Cooper’s view that the percep-
tion of beauty is linked to some moral notions. However, I think, one 
may adopt two different attitudes towards a damaged landscape that, re-
spectively, reveal two different relationships between the moral and the 
aesthetic. The first one – which I think is the wrong one – tends to make 
the aesthetic dependent upon the moral; so that, if something is shown 
to be morally wrong, or the result of a moral wrong, then it is perceived 
as less beautiful, or as straightforwardly ugly. The second, the one I en-
dorse, does not take morality to dictate the aesthetic result. It may inform 
the aesthetic experience, so that it also becomes a way of revealing the 
(moral) history of the environment judged, but it does not necessarily 
transform beauty into ugliness.
How then, shall we understand the relationship between the aesthetic 
quality revealed in an experience of a damaged landscape or environ-
ment and other non-aesthetic considerations, such as ecological or moral 
ones? It seems to me that any sort of link that we aim to establish that 
makes the aesthetic dependent upon the moral, the scientific, or the eco-
logical, threatens the autonomy of the aesthetic judgement. If our identi-
fication of positive and negative values in morality is sufficient to deter-
mine the aesthetic value of a particular object, landscape or environment, 
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we get close to rejecting the necessity of an aesthetic experience in order 
to reach an aesthetic judgement. Thus, simply pointing to a negative eco-
logical reason would be enough to claim that the corresponding aesthetic 
judgement will be negative too. However, I think that, even if we think 
that other non-aesthetic considerations might enter, inform, and deter-
mine our aesthetic experience, the autonomy of the judgement of taste 
must be preserved. The crucial point is to understand this relationship 
as one in which the determination is not overriding. For example, the 
thought that the appearance of the Mazarrón Mines landscape has been 
produced through years of mining work and exploitation penetrates my 
perceptual experience so that the colours, shapes, and forms that I per-
ceive bear on that history. I do not simply see a beautiful arrangement 
of colours; I see the traces of different strata that have been carved and 
removed. I may even imagine what kinds of work were undertaken in or-
der to extract the minerals (mainly, silver, lead, zinc, and iron). All these 
thoughts that correspond with the actual history of the place can be an 
important constituent of my experience and they add colour and give 
significance to all of them. 
If the aesthetic appreciation of nature must be such that we appreci-
ate it as nature, as what it is, it seems then that all the information that 
explains or is related to the appearance that particular landscape has 
is a key element of the experience this landscape is to afford. However, 
the positive or negative judgement about the history behind a particular 
landscape does not in itself determine the quality of our aesthetic experi-
ence and the positive or negative quality of our aesthetic judgement.
We can, then, claim that as well as looking at a work of art with the 
appropriate information about its style, period of production, technique, 
etc., that might be necessary to properly grasp its aesthetic value, we 
need to take into account the particular history that a particular land-
scape has. If I do not know, for example, that a particular portrait was 
produced with the intention of making fun of the person portrayed, I 
might probably miss some aesthetic aspects of the portrait. However, 
knowing that there was an intention to mock someone (and maybe, judg-
ing that this sort of intention might be morally wrong) does not lessen 
the work aesthetically. Similarly, knowing that a history of exploitation 
and degradation lies behind the appearance that I perceive frames my 
perceptual experience in that particular way, but it does not straightfor-
wardly determine whether the resulting aesthetic experience is positive 
or negative. As in art, experience has the last word in the aesthetic ap-
preciation of nature. 
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Moreover, not only do I think our aesthetic experiences of environ-
mental objects are connected with other – maybe ecological – consider-
ations, indeed, I propose that they may even be revelatory of such con-
siderations: aesthetic experiences may highlight those aspects with a 
new strength. Thus, our awareness of the landscape as damaged is, in 
turn, partly informed through the aesthetic experience that reveals it 
as sublime, beautiful, or astonishing; and in that sense, it is precisely 
through aesthetic attention that our overall experience becomes in-
sightful in a broader sense. 
The aesthetic sentiments become, in this way, useful tools to focus our 
attention upon features that might be revelatory of the particular history 
behind the configuration of an environment and to become sensitive to 
aspects of that environment. 
Final remark: sublime rather than beauty?
There might be a final point worth considering given the plausibility of 
an aesthetic mischaracterization of some of the examples of damaged 
nature. It could be claimed that these sorts of cases are better character-
ized in terms of the sublime rather than the beautiful.23 Even if the dam-
aged condition of the burned wood does not turn the aesthetic experience 
into one of ugliness, it seems odd to simply claim that we experience the 
burned wood as beautiful; rather, the appropriate feeling towards such 
landscapes is one in which a certain mix of negative and positive feelings 
is involved –one that can probably be better characterized as sublime. 
I think this is a sound possibility regarding some of the examples one 
may think of. After all, there is a long tradition within the aesthetic cat-
egory of the sublime that confirms the adequacy of this particular senti-
ment for a number of landscapes. 
This proposal could then be understood as a possible accommodation 
within a particular aesthetic experience of the negative moral quality 
involved in any damaged landscape. Thus, describing the experience of 
damaged landscapes as sublime instead of beautiful will accommodate 
both the intuition that there is something odd in taking pleasure in a 
damaged environment and the belief that some damaged environments 
possess indisputable aesthetic value.
Nevertheless, I think there are no reasons for a priori ruling out the 
possibility of finding different damaged landscapes as possessing dif-
ferent aesthetic qualities, among them beauty. First, the consideration 
of other possible aesthetic categories – especially those essentially con-
nected to negative feelings, that can help us to grasp in a better and finer 
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way the sort of aesthetic experience one may have in paradigmatic cases 
of damaged natural environments – still leaves open the possibility of 
cases of beautiful damaged nature. Second, I do not think a set of criteria 
that determine which cases are better described as sublime, beautiful 
or picturesque can be offered in a non-problematic way. In fact, trying 
to offer these criteria will lead to the former attempt – which I rejected 
on the basis of aesthetics’ autonomy – of finding correlations between 
moral reasons (or other non-aesthetic features) and aesthetic qualities. I 
think whether a particular landscape looks sublime, beautiful, amazing, 
or weird and wonderful is a matter that can only be settled by experienc-
ing the landscape or environment in question. Again, I think that this 
experience is not disconnected from the relevant thoughts about what 
we are experiencing. These thoughts inform and frame my perceptual 
experience, even though I cannot exclusively rely upon them in order 
to determine the aesthetic quality of a particular landscape or natural 
environment.
Certainly, our morality enters our aesthetic sensibility but – if aesthetic 
autonomy holds – it does not do so in the form of an absolute authority. 
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